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RECENT DECISIONS
tion.29 Another proposal" suggests mandatory insurance coverage for all
corporations which can be waived only upon showing of sufficient capital-
ization. Since the Zubik case involves maritime law there is a third pos-
sible remedy. The historic purpose of maritime laws is to preserve and
protect maritime shipping and commercial interests. The Zubik decision
jeopardizes these interests by permitting individuals to operate thinly
capitalized corporations on our waters free from any risk of personal
liability. In order to protect and perpetuate these interests the maritime
tort claimant should not have to bear the heavy burden of proof required
by Zubik before the corporate entity will be disregarded. It is submitted
that the Zubik court did not give adequate consideration to the protective
purposes of maritime law.
Salvatore J. Cucinotta
TRUSTS-PURPOSE CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLIcY-The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court clarifies and updates its views on the validity of marriage
and re-marriage conditions which are annexed to a testamentary trust,
relating to the religion and national origin of the spouse of a beneficiary.
In re Estate of Keffalas, 426 Pa. 432, 233 A.2d 248 (1967).
John Keffalas died testate on April 19, 1956. His last Will and Testament,
dated December 8, 1944, was admitted to probate on May 1, 1956. The
relevant paragraphs in the will are as follows:
"Fourth: To my daughter, Dorothy J. Keffalas Gregory, I give one-
hundred dollars.... Should my daughter Dorothy either by divorice [sic]
or death remarry a man of true Greek blood and descent and of Orthodox
religion, . . .she shall after one year of successful marriage receive the
sum of two-thousand ($2,000) from my trust funds."' [Dorothy had
married a non-Greek prior to execution of the will].
Fifth through Eleventh: A conditional bequest to each child but
Dorothy of $2,000.00, on condition that such child marry a person of
"true Greek blood and descent and of Orthodox religion."'
Twelfth and Thirteenth: Disposed of testator's business to his three
eldest sons, upon the same condition.
29. The Pennsylvania Senate has passed a new Business Corporation Law where the
close corporation is defined to consist of 30 or less stock holders. Senate Bill No. 1169 (1967):
Chap. B, Art. III, Sec. 1(4).
30. Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts oj Their Corporations,
76 YALE L.J. 1190 (1967).
1. In re Estate of Keffalas, 426 Pa. 432, 434, 233 A.2d 248, 250 (1967).
2. Id.
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"Fourteenth: Should any of my children marry a person not of true
Greek blood and descent and Orthodox religion and either by divorce or
death remarry a person of true Greek blood and descent and Orthodox
religion, . . . he or she shall after at least one year of successful marriage
receive the sum of two-thousand dollars ($2,000.) from my trust funds."'
Characterizing the will of the testator as "an example of bigotry and
prejudice,"4 the Orphans' Court of Butler County found void as against
public policy, all gift provisions of the will dealing with the marriages
and/or remarriages to Greeks of Orthodox religion. In so holding, the
full amounts of the conditional gifts were awarded, as if there had been
no conditions annexed to them. From this decision, the executors ap-
pealed.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a vague but unanimous
opinion written by Justice O'Brien, affirmed the invalidity of Paragraphs
Fourth and Fourteenth, while reversing the degree on invalidity of Para-
graphs Fifth through Thirteenth. The reasoning of the court is set out
below:
"the court below held, and we agree, that the condition in Paragraphs
Fourth and Fourteenth, although not violative of freedom of religion, was
conducive to divorce and thus violative of public policy."5 (No mention
is made of Paragraphs Fifth through Thirteenth having the same fault.)
"When a disposition tends to lead to divorce, as this one does,... it is
void." (Relating to Paragraphs Fourth and Fourteenth as indicated im-
mediately above).
"However, we do not agree with the learned court below that the
invalidity of . . . Paragraph Fourteenth taints all other provisions of the
will subject to a marriage condition .... The marriage conditions are of
themselves valid."6 (Paragraph Fourth contains a re-marriage condition,
as does Paragraph Fourteenth, and they are declared invalid, but the
mere marriage conditions of Paragraphs Fifth through Thirteenth are
permitted to stand as written).
In so reasoning and deciding, the court held, that marriage conditions
dealing with certain religious and nationality requirements may be valid,
but that re-marriage conditions awarding gifts to beneficiaries who sepa-
rate by death or divorce from non-qualifying spouses and later marry
spouses who do qualify, are conducive to divorce and are against public
policy, and that such conditions are invalid and will be ignored.
3. Id.
4. Record, at p. 70a, In re Estate of Keffalas, 426 Pa. 432, 233 A.2d 248 (1967).
5. 426 Pa. at 434, 233 A.2d at 250.
6. Id. at 435, 233 A.2d at 251.
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At Common Law there was a well-defined interest in preserving the
freedom of marriage and religion, and in the preservation of the family
relation.' As has been stated by Professor Scott:
It is against public policy to permit a disposition of property in
such a manner as to offer a financial inducement to the doing of
certain acts, innocent in themselves, but which ought not to be
encouraged by holding out pecuniary rewards for the doing of
them."
Pennsylvania has followed the general Common Law principles in
holding that such provisions may be invalid. As was stated in Justus's
Estate,9 "In Pennsylvania the right of a man to do as he will with his own
has always been liberally construed. Accordingly, a donor, not under any
obligation to give, may give with such conditions as he pleases, subject
only to the restriction that the conditions shall not be clearly illegal."' 1 In
the Justus case, the testator left his daughter $500 per annum for life,
with the added provision that should she survive her husband, or separate
from him and have nothing to do with him, then, and in either event, she
was to have one-half of the income from his very large estate. The Justus
court held that the condition was intended to tempt and induce the
daughter to abandon her husband, and was therefore unlawful as against
public policy, thus the condition was exised, vesting the gift.
Much confusion has arisen on the subject of exactly what a testator
must or must not do to stay within the confines of Justus's Estate. It now
appears the validity of conditions such as these is not governed by the
actual words employed within the condition, but by what the testator's
intention was when the will, complete with conditions, was executed. If
the testator's intention was contra to public policy, then so is the condi-
tion." The following cases illustrate this point.
7. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 211 (2d ed. 1965).
8. A. ScOTT ON TRUSTS § 62.3 (3d ed. 1967).
9. 5 Pa. D. & C. 749 (Venango, 1924).
10. Id. at 750.
11. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, § 425 (1944). Restraints on Some First Marriages.
(1) An otherwise effective condition precedent, special limitation, condition subse-
quent, or executory limitation which is designed to prevent the acquisition of an
interest in land or in things other than land in the event of some, but not all first
marriages, is valid, except as stated in Subsection (2).
(2) A provision such as described in Subsection (1) is invalid if the circumstances
under which a marriage is permitted are such that a permitted marriage is not
likely to occur, unless the dominant motive of the conveyor is to provide support
until such marriage or in the event of such marriage, in which case the restraint
is valid.
c. Some marriages-Members of a group. Restrains frequently are employed to
induce the conveyee to marry within the membership of a designated religious faith,
or to refrain from marrying a member of such group. Whether or not the restraint
is merely partial frequently depends upon the type and strength of the religious
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In Morton Estate,"2 property in Philadelphia was left to a daughter,
"providing that my daughter is divorced from her husband. ,,is The
orphan's court stated:
Where the testator's purpose, in imposing a condition, is to
induce future separation or divorce of husband and wife, the
condition is void as against public policy and the devise or
legacy takes effect. [Citing Cases] If the will, however, merely
provides for the contingency of divorce, and does not express
an intent to bring it about, the provision is valid.'4
The Morton Court attempted to ascertain testatrix's intent and concluded
that the sole purpose was to induce divorce, and was therefore invalid as
against public policy.
In Rininger's Estate, 5 testator provided for a life income to his son,
and provided further, "in the event that my son, Joseph E. Rininger, shall
become unmarried, either through death of his wife, Ada Rininger, or by
process of law, .. . ."I' then the entire amount held in trust shall be paid
over to him. It was held that the gift was not intended to induce divorce,
but only provided for a contingency of it, and the gift and the condition
were held valid of it, and the gift and the condition were held valid. The
supreme court decided that the intention of the testator was to provide an
assured income if his son was married, but that such assured income
was not necessary if the son was not married.
In Fisher Estate,'7 testator provided that the income from his estate
should be paid to his daughter for life, with the provision, "If, however,
my daughter, Evelyn Fisher Sperlbaum, should become widowed or
divorced from her husband, her portion of my estate otherwise held in
trust shall thereupon be paid to her absolutely."' 8 In this case, the
orphan's court looked at all possible evidence in trying to ascertain the
testator's intention, even admitting extrinsic evidence of the testator's
great dislike for his son-in-law, and concluded that the testator's intent
beliefs of the conveyee. If marriage within the permitted sphere would be so con-
trary to those beliefs it is unlikely that such marriage will ever occur, the restraint is
general and anvalid. On the other hand, if the religious beliefs of the conveyee do
not stand in the way of such marriage, but the number of persons eligible for mar-
riage to the conveyee is negligible, again the restraint is general and invalid.
12. 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 148 (Philadelphia 1957).
13. Id. at 149.
14. Id. at 150. Accord, A. ScoTt oN TRUSTS § 62.4 (3d ed. 1967): "The question of the
legality of the provision therefore depends upon all the circumstances, the nature of the
provision, the extent to which it would naturally tend to induce divorce or separation, the
motives of the settlor, and the like."
15. 305 Pa. 203, 157 A. 488 (1931).
16. Id. at 205, 157 A. at 450.
17. 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 526 (Montgomery, 1962).
18. Id. at 527.
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was to induce a divorce, and struck down the condition as offensive to
public policy.
In affirming the invalidity of Paragraphs Fourth and Fourteenth in the
instant case, limited discussion is made by the court as to John Keffalas's
intention when executing the conditions within these paragraphs. It is
submitted that perhaps it could have been found that the intention was
other than inducing divorce, and/or that there could have been other
reasons for the holding. Provisions have been upheld when the conditions
have been equally shocking, such as $30,000 in trust to pay the income
to Helen Morton for life, or so long as she remains unmarried,"19 with a
gift over to another in the event of her marriage or death; or a devise to
a son in trust, providing that title shall vest absolutely "if he separates
from his wife by death or divorce; "20 or where a will provided that if
legatee married out of his religious faith, that he would forfeit his share."
Paragraphs Fifth through Thirteenth dealt with only marriage condi-
tions, and were different from the divorce, death and re-marriage condi-
tions of Paragraphs Fourth and Fourteenth. In those paragraphs the
conditions dealt with the separation from a non-qualifying spouse, fol-
lowed by a marriage to one that did qualify. The Paragraphs now under
discussion dealt with original marriage to a non-qualifying spouse, and
the final adjudication of the validity of those conditions of the Keffalas
will.
In Clayton's Estate,22 a gift was made to William Clayton that would
vest only when William, at his death, had issue of a Roman Catholic
mother, or was survived by a Roman Catholic wife, or in the event that
his last wife, if she predeceased him, was a Roman Catholic. This provi-
sion was upheld, the orphan's court making a statement that also serves
to uphold Paragraphs Fifth through Thirteenth of the Keffalas wil:
a religious restriction operating only on the choice of a wife is
too remote to be recognized as coercive of religious faith....
a condition which tends to coerce religious faith is void, at least
one that coerces the faith of a beneficiary. Nothing in these
conditions affects the faith of William H. Clayton or of his issue,
or to anyone who can benefit directly under the will.2
In dealing with conditions that tend to restrain marriage, Professor
Scott states: "A disposition of property may be illegal on the ground of its
tendency to restrain marrage,"24 The Restatement (Second) of Trusts
has a comment directly on point:
19. Holbrook's Estate, 213 Pa. 93, 94 (1905).
20. King's Estate, 58 Pittsburgh L.J. 377 (Allegheny, 1910).
21. Clayton's Estate, 13 Pa. D. & C. 413 (Philadelphia, 1929), aff'd 302 Pa. 468 (1931).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 416.
24. A. ScoTT ON TRUSTS § 62.6 (3d ed. 1967).
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Restraining Marriage. A provision in the terms of the trust may
be held invalid on the ground that its enforcement would tend to
restrain the marriage of the beneficiary. Thus, a provision in the
terms of the trust divesting the interest of a beneficiary if he or
she should ever marry anyone may be invalid. Such a provision
with respect to the remarriage of a widow, however, is valid. So
also, such a provision is not invalid if it does not impose an
undue restraint on marriage. Thus, a provision divesting the
interest of the beneficiary if he or she should marry a particular
person, or should marry before reaching majority, or should
marry without the consent of the trustee, or should marry of a
particular religious faith, or one of a different faith from that of
the beneficiary, is not ordinarily invalid. So also, where the
settlor manifests an intention not to restrain marriage of the
beneficiary, but to furnish maintenance to the beneficiary while
single, the provision is valid.
25
It has been aptly stated:
Respected men and women, as well as eccentric people, some-
times make sound, and sometimes eccentric wills. Courts, heirs,
and excluded beneficiaries often wish (1) they could change or
delete clear and plain and specific language, or (2) rewrite a will
to expand or change the testator's bounty in order to conform
to what they believe would be fair and wiser, or to conform to
what they think the testator would have said if he had forseen
the existing facts and circumstances. but that is not and never
has been the law of Pennsylvania. 6
The final matter in the discussion of Keffalas is the inquiry into what
becomes of gifts whose conditions have been declared illegal. In England,
there was never any concern for the testator's intent, and rules of law,
rather than construction, were used to dispose of property subject to
conditions. In trusts of real property, if the condition was illegal, the
gift failed, and there was a resulting trust back to the estate to be dis-
posed of through the residuary clause if there was one, or through the
rules of intestacy. As for trusts of personalty, if the condition was malum
in se, the gift failed and was treated the same as an illegal gift of real
property. If the condition was merely malum prohibitum, the condition
failed, and the gift was absolute, awarded free of the condition. It is
fortunate that in the United States such arbitrary rules of law are not
present. In this country the tendancy is to give effect to the testator's
intention. Thus, if the testator provides for a gift over if a condition
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS § 62, comment g.
26. Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 578, 127 A.2d 287, 314 (1956).
27. A. ScoTT ON TRuSTS § 65.3 (3d ed. 1967).
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should be found illegal, or if he states that if any conditions shall be found
illegal that beneficiaries should take free of them, there is no problem.
Difficulty arises, however, when the testator has not considered the possi-
bility of illegality. In such cases, the courts must determine how he would
have disposed of the property had the possibility of illegality been known
to him. In the absence of a contrary intent, the inference is that the
settlor would have intended that the gift be absolute rather than fail
altogether, and the more recent cases have indicated that there is indeed
a rule of construction, and that the gift is absolute, as if no condition was
ever attached to it." The Restatement (Second) of Trusts also agrees
that there is a rule of construction to be followed wherever possible in
cases of this nature,29 and gives the following example:
Thus, if a testator bequeaths money to trustees to pay the in-
come to a man if he should first divorce his wife, and the condi-
tion is illegal, the beneficiary is entitled to the income, whether
or not he divorces his wife, unless a contrary intent of testator is
shown.30
It thus appears that there is ample authority for the holding of the
supreme court in the Keffalas decision. The court applied common law
principles as supplemented by Pennsylvania case law, and reached a
result that is generally in accord with the textwriters, as well as the
Restatements. It is suggested, however, thta the next time a case of this
type comes before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that steps be taken
to clarify some of the anbiguity surrounding the wording of this decision,
and that workable rules be set down that can be easily understood and
interpreted.
Michael J. Aranson
28. Jamieson's Estate, 55 Pa. D. & C. 435 (Philadelphia, 1946); Morton Estate, 13 Pa.
D. & C.2d 148 (Philadelphia, 1957); Fisher Estate, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 526 (Montgomery
1962).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 65, comment f: "Where, as is ordinarily
the case, the settlor has made no provision as to what should happen if the condition should
be held illegal, the beneficiary is entitled to the interest whether or not the event happens
unless it appears from properly admitted evidence that it would probably have been the
intention of the settlor that if the condition should be illegal the interest of the beneficiary
should fail altogether.
30. Id.
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